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TORTS-LIABILITY OF A LANDLORD FOR INJURIES TO PERSONS ON
THE PREMISES-COVENANT TO REPAIR-EFFECT OF REPAIRS MADE
UNDER SucH CoVENANT SUBSEQUENT TO AN INJURY CAUSED BY DEFECT REPAIRED-It is generally agreed that the tort liability of the
holder of an estate in land is an incident of occupation or control. 1
However, the courts are not agreed as to the degree of control which
will sustain such liability. 2 Neither are their holdings uniform as to
the inferences which are to be drawn with respect thereto from the
existence of an agreement by a landlord to make repairs3 or from the
act of a landlord in repairing a defect in demised premises under such
agreement, subsequent to an injury caused by the defect repaired. 4
New York and Ohio were at one time in agreement as to the liability of a landlord for injuries to persons on the premises and the legal

2 TORTS R:asTATEMENT §357 (1935); 163 A.L.R. 327 (1946).
163 A.L.R. 327 et seq. (1946).
s 8 A.L.R. 765 (1920); 68 A.L.R. ll95 (1930); 163 A.L.R. 300 (1946).
4 E.g., Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E. (2d) 545 (1949); Noble v. Marx,
298 N.Y. 106, 81 N.E. (2d) 40 (1948).
1

2
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effect of an agreement to repair. 5 Recently decided cases in each jurisdiction on fundamentally the same facts indicate that this may no
longer be true. 6 It is the purpose of this comment to examine the
decisions in these two jurisdictions since the time of apparent agreement to discover if there has been a divergence of view on the question and if so, the extent of such divergence.
1. Two Recent Cases

Case I-Ohio. Defendant was the owner of a three-story brick
building. He rented the second and third B.oors of the building to
plaintiff on a month-to-month basis. Plaintiff occupied one of the
apartments at the rear of the second Hoar, and rented the remainder of
the rooms to others. The landlord agreed to be responsible for repairing the building outside. Plaintiff went to a porch in the back of her
apartment to shake a small rug. As she leaned against the porch railing,
a section gave way, and she fell to the ground. A few days later, defendant repaired the defective railing. Plaintiff sued defendant to recover for injuries received in her fall. Held: Liability in tort is an
incident to occupation and control. Defendant's agreement to repair,
plus his act of repairing the defective railing, was not sufficient evidence of occupation or control to sustain tort liability. 7
Case 2-New York. Defendant was owner of a two-family apartment building. One of the apartments was occupied by plaintiff under
a written lease providing in part that plaintiff should keep the premises in good repair, but on failure of plaintiff to make such repairs, the
landlord might make them. The lease also permitted the landlord to
enter the premises during reasonable hours of the day to inspect the
premises and to make necessary repairs. At the time plaintiff rented
the apartment, the B.oor of the bathroom was defective. The rental
agent promised plaintiff that defendant would repair the defect. Plaintiff was injured when her heel caught in a hole in the bathroom B.oor.
Three days later, defendant had the defect repaired. Plaintiff sued
defendant to recover for injuries received in her fall. Held: Liability
in tort is an incident of occupation and control. 'Where lease gave
landlord the right to enter to make repairs, evidence that, for a period
antedating the term of the lease, landlord through agent had notice of
5 See Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931); Berkowitz v. Winston,
128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934).
6Supra, note 4.
7 Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E. (2d) 545 (1949).
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the defective condition but failed to make repair in response to tenant's
demand, and evidence of repairs made by landlord after the accident,
were sufficient to justify a verdict for the tenant." 8
It will be noted that both courts appear to start with the same major
premise. Yet they reach opposite conclusions on what appear to be
fundamentally similar facts, when the facts are limited to those relevant to the major premise initially stated.
2. Control and the Agreement to Repair
Twenty years ago a minority of jurisdictions held that a covenant
to repair necessarily implied the reservation by the landlord of a right
to enter and have possession of the premises for the purpose of making
repairs, that this degree of control would be sufficient to sustain a tort
liability, and that if his negligence in making or failing to make the
repairs resulted in an unsafe condition of the premises, he was liable
for injuries to persons lawfully on the premises who were not guilty
of contributory negligence. 9 This view was accepted by the American
Law Institute in its Restatement of Torts,1° where it is made clear that
the liability rests in tort and not upon contract and is an incident of
control.11
At that time a majority of courts, although not in agreement as to
the degree of control required to sustain a tort liability, held that the
breach by a landlord of an agreement to repair leased premises imposed
on him no liability for personal injuries to a tenant or other person on
the premises caused by a defect in the premises, either in tort or assumpsit.12 This was so despite the fact that since 1794, when Payne
v. Rogers13 was decided, it has been universally accepted that a landlord's covenant to repair demised premises during the term of the lease
makes him liable for any harm suffered by persons outside the premises
s Noble v. Marx, 298 N.Y. 106 (syll.) (1948).
o 8 A.L.R. 765 (1920); 68 A.L.R. 1195 (1930).
lO 2 TonTs RBsTATEMENT §357 (1935): "A lessor of land is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to his lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee
or his sublessee by a condition of disrepair existing before or after the lessee has taken possession, if (a) the lessor, as such, has agreed by a covenant in the lease or otherwise, to keep
the land in repair, and (b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the
land which the performance of the lessor's agreement would have prevented."
11 Ibid., comment a: "The lessor's duty to repair •.• is not contractual but is a tort duty
based on the fact that the contract gives the lessor ability to make the repairs and control over

them."

12 68 A.L.R.

I 195 (1930).

1a 2 H. Bl. 350, 126 Eng. Rep. 590 (1794).
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by his failure to repair any dangerous condition, even though it developed after the tenant had gone into possession.14
In Cullings v. Goetz,1 5 decided in 1931, the New York Court of
Appeals considered and rejected the view of the Restatement for that
of the then majority primarily, it would seem, because of the force of
precedent and the effect of a contrary decision on lessors having repair
covenants in their leases under a belief ·that no tort liability was entailed.16 Chief Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, laid down the
test of landlord liability in these words:
"Liability in tort is an incident to occupation or control. ...
By preponderant opinion, occupation and control are not reserved
through an agreement that the landlord will repair.... The tenant
and no one else may keep visitors away until the danger is abated,
or adapt the warning to the need. The landlord has at most a
privilege to enter for the doing of the work, and at times not even
that if the occupant protests. 'The power of control necessary to
raise the duty ... implies something more than the right or liability to repair the premises. It implies the power and the right to
exclude people from them.' "17
and later:
"What resulted was not a reservation by an owner of one of
the privileges of ownership. It was the assumption of a burden for
the benefit of the occupant with consequences the same as if there
had been a promise to repair by a plumber or a carpenter."18
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio had aligned itself with the then
majority. In Berkowitz v. Winston,1° decided in 1934, Matthais, J.,
speaking for the court said:
"The rule that liability in tort is an incident to occupation or
control, and that a covenant to repair does not impose upon the
lessor a liability in tort at the suit of the lessee or other on the
premises in the right of the lessee, has been generally adopted and
applied, though there are some announcements to the contrary.
The majority view is presented with cogent reasoning and ample
citation of authority by Cardozo, C.J., in a comparatively recent
decision in Cullings v. Goetz . ..."20
"Fifty Years of Torts,'' 50 HARv. L. REv. 725 at 747 (1937).
15256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931).
16 Id. at 291-292.
11 Id. at 290.
1s Id. at 291.
10 128 Ohio St. 611, 193 N.E. 343 (1934).
20 Id. at 613-614.
14 Bohlen,
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Today it may no longer be said that there is a clear majority and
minority view; the courts are about equally divided on the question. 21
There is a pronounced trend toward the view that a landlord is liable
under such circurnstances.22 It is suggested that recent New York cases,
culminating in Noble v. Marx, supra, indicate that New York is but
a step away from the former minority position. Ohio, on the other
hand, as is illustrated by Cooper v. Roose, supra, holds firmly in accordance with the former majority, and New York, view.

3. Control-What Degree

As has been previously noted, implicit in the view of the Restatement and of the courts following it, with respect to the effect of an
agreement to repair on a landlord's liability, is a holding that control
for the purpose of making repairs is sufficient to sustain tort liability.23
Since both New York and Ohio explicitly rejected the view of the
Restatement, and Ohio specifically accepted the New York view as set
forth in Cullings v. Goetz, it would appear not unreasonable to expect
the two courts to reach the same results on the same evidentiary facts.
Subsequently decided cases and the language of the two courts therein
indicate the contrary to be true. The divergence can be explained only
on the basis of differing prescriptions of the degree of control necessary
to sustain tort liability, and in the inferences which the two courts are
willing to draw from the evidentiary facts.
The required degree of control which was in the mind of Chief
Justice Cardozo when he wrote the opinion in Cullings v. Goetz, he
expressed in the words of a leading English case:
"The power of control necessary to raise the duty ... implies
the power and the right to admit people to the premises and to exclude people from them."24
It will be noted that the control here visualized is a rather substantial
one.
21 "It now seems improper to say that it is the majority rule that the landlord is not
liable for personal injuries, for it is doubtful whether a majority of the courts adhere unqualifiedly to this view.•••" 163 A.L.R. 300 (1946).
22 lbid.
23 Supra, notes IO and ll.
24 Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287 at 290, 176 N.E. 397 (1931), quoting from Cavalier
v. Pope, [1906] A.C. 428. It is interesting to note that the English court cited as authority for
its statement, Miller v. Hancock, [1893] 2 Q.B. 177, a leading English case on the liability
of landlords for injuries to persons on stairways and other areas of common use over which
the landlord retains control.
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The Supreme Court of Ohio approved the rule of Cullings v. Goetz
in Berkowitz v. Winston, as has been previously noted. 25 It interpreted
the rule in Ripple v. Mahoning National Bank,26 decided in 1944.
In its syllabus the court said:
"The reservation in a lease of a suit of rooms for use as a private
office, whereby control thereof is retained only 'for the purpose of
repairing the same and the doing of daily janitor work,' does not
render the lessor liable for injuries sustained by an employee of
the lessee caused by falling plaster, in an absence of authority of
the lessor to exercise control over such premises to the exclusion
of any control by the lessee."27

In its opinion the thought was expressed in these words:
"The employer of the plaintiff was a tenant, a lessee, and not ·
a mere licensee in the building. The office occupied by him was a
'private office room' and the plaintiff cannot recover in the absence
of showing that the lessor had a right of control to the exclusion
of any control by the tenant if the former elected to exercise such
right."2s
Ohio interprets the "power and right to admit people to the premises
and to exclude people from them" to mean "exclusive control by the
lessor" who is sought to be held liable.
The New York "interpretation" of these words is in effect a renunciation of them as a test of a landlord's liability. In Scudero v.
Campbell,2° it was held that an act of repairing a defect in premises
subsequent to an injury suffered by a licensee of the tenant was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding by a jury that the landlord had
sufficient control over the premises to support a tort liability. Implicit
in this holding is a subordinate holding that the degree of control
necessary to sustain a finding of a tort liability is control for the purpose of making repairs. In Antonsen v. Bay Ridge Savings Bank,80
decided in 1944, the New York Court of Appeals approved an instruction of a trial justice that:
"There may be no recovery in this case for the plaintiffs based
on the alleged promise to repair the ceiling ... that there is no
25 Supra, notes 19 and 20.
2G 143 Ohio St. 614, 56 N.E. (2d) 289 (1944).
21 Id. at 614. Cf. Noble v. Marx, 298 N.Y. 106,

81 N.E. (2d) 40 (1948). Italics added.
Id. at 620. Cf. the language used in Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397
(1931).
20 288 N.Y. 328, 43 N.E. (2d) 66 (1942).
so 292 N.Y. 143, 54 N.E. (2d) 338 (1944).
28
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duty at common law on the part of the owner or one acting in
the owner's stead to repair a ceiling in a two-family house such as
involved in this case, where the portion of the premises involved
was demised in its entirety."31
The court said, with reference to the element of control:
"In view of those instructions ... there is implicit in the verdict
for the plaintiffs a finding that, under the terms of the lease by
which the plaintiffs occupied the apartment, the defendant as landlord reserved control of the premises to the extent of permitting it
to make repairs. In support of such a finding there is evidence
... from which the jury could find 'a reservation by ... [the defendant] of one of the privileges of ownership' ... [Citing Cullings v. Goetz].... [The] basis [of defendant's liability] ... was
the evidence to which reference has been made from which the
jury could have found that the possession and dominion of the
premises demised by the defendant to the plaintiffs was not exclusive and complete but reserved to the defendant such a measure
of control as permitted it ·to make necessary repairs." 32
Noble v. Marx cited both the Scudero and the Antonsen cases as authority for its holding.
In view of these cases it would appear that New York not only
rejects the "exclusive control by the landlord" test of the Ohio courts,
but also the "power and right to admit people to or exclude people
from the premises" test of Cullings v. Goetz. It totally disregards that
part of the quotation approved by the court in that case which says in
so many words, "the power of control necessary to raise the duty
... implies more than the right or liability to repair the premises,"33
and fastens avidly upon a later casual phrase, "a reservation by (the
defendant) of one of the privileges of ownership,"34 which was, in its
original context, used negatively. It finds liability where there is non· "control"by the tenant.
excIusive

4. Evidentiary Facts and Inferences-Subsequent Repair
Space will not permit a detailed treatment of this phase of the
subject. It is sufficient for our purpose to point out that under the
"exclusive control by the landlord" doctrine of the Ohio court, any
s1 Id. at 146.
32 Id. at 146-147.
33 Note 17, supra.
84 Note 18, supra.

Italics added.
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evidence of control exercised by the tenant will defeat an action against
his landlord. 35 Under the language of the New York court and its
"non-exclusive control by the tenant" doctrine, it should follow that
any evidence of control exercised by the landlord would sustain an
action against him. Yet, before summing up the evidence in the Marx
case, supra, the court said:
"The written lease ... gives evidence of the right expressly
reserved by the defendant landlord to enter the plaintiff's apartment during reasonable hours 'to ascertain if said premises are
kept in proper repair and condition and to make any repairs that
the Landlord may deem necessary for the preservation or safety
of the premises or appurtenances'. There was also evidence that
at the time of making the lease and at various times during the
term of the lease prior to the accident agents of the defendant had
made unfulfilled oral promises to repair the defective B.oor condition which later caused the plaintiff's injuries. If this were the
only evidence of control exercised by the defendant it might be
true that 'what resulted was not a reservation by an owner of one
of the privileges of ownership.' "36
But, the court concludes:
"In the circumstances presented by this record, including defendant' s evidence of repairs made by her after the accident and
received solely on the question of control, and the further evidence
that for. a period of time which antedated the term of the lease,
the defendant through her agent had notice of the defective condition but failed, in response to the plaintiff's demands, to exercise
the right expressly reserved by her in the lease to enter the premises
to make necessary repairs, we think there was evidence 'enough
to countenance the verdict.' "37
Thus it would seem that any evidence of an act of the landlord in
coming upon leased premises to make repairs under a right reserved
in a lease will permit a jury to infer the degree of control necessary to
liability. In Scudero v. Campbell the act alone was held sufficient to
permit such an inference. And it would appear that a landlord may
reserve to himself one of the "privileges of ownership" (i.e., the right
to come on the land) without liability, but if evidence discloses that
85 Goodall v. Deters, 121 Ohio St. 432, 169 N.E. 443 (1929); Berkowitz v. Winston,
128 Ohio St. 611, 195 N.E. 343 (1934); Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E. (2d)
545 (1949).
as Noble v. Marx, 298 N.Y. 106, 81 N.E. (2d) 40 (1948). Italics added.
s11d. at 111.
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he in fact exercised that right, he may be liable in tort. It may be
remarked in passing that it is a very peculiar "right" which, upon its
exercise, is automatically transformed into an inchoate ground for tort
liability.
It will be noted that while the New York court will permit a jury
to infer control from the landlord's act of entering, it will not itself
make the inference as a matter of law. Likewise, it will not permit a
jury to infer, nor will it infer as a matter of law, from either the reservation of a right to enter or from a covenant to repair, non-exclusive
control by a tenant, at least in an action involving an injury to one upon
the premises. Yet in Appel v. Muller, 38 decided in 1933, two years
after Cullings v. Goetz, it was held that a landlord who reserved the
right to make repairs but did not covenant to do so was nevertheless
liable for personal injuries sustained by one outside the premises, since
by the reservation of right to repair the landlord ''had never parted
so completely with possession and control that he had disabled himself
from performing his duty of care."39 "It would seem that if the landlord had control as to pedestrians on the street he also had control as
to persons on the premises, insofar as making repairs was concerned."40
And if the court will infer control as a matter of law from a reservation
of right, it is difficult to see why such an inference may not as easily
be drawn from an agreement to repair. The element of control would
seem to be independent of the location of the injured party; it would
also seem evident that an agreement to repair without a right thereunder to enter for the purpose of making the repairs would be not only
a useless act, but also a trap for the unwary, visiting unexpected tort
liability upon one acting in the conscientious discharge of his contract
obligations. The desirability of this result may well be questioned.
It may also be pointed out that the present holding of the New York
court is an open invitation to breach-of-contract.

5. Summary
Under the former minority and Restatement view of the law, an
agreement to repair will permit an inference of control for the purpose
of making the repairs which is sufficient to compel a landlord to respond
in tort for personal injuries to persons lawfully on the premises where
as 262 N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785 (1933).
s0 Id. at 283; 163 A.L.R. 328-329 (1946).
40

163 A.L.R. 329 (1946).
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the injury is caused by a defect in the premises coming into existence
either before or after his tenant takes possession. Under the New York
view, by a process of redefinition, the degree of control which will
entail liability has been progressively reduced to exactly the same degree
as that required by the courts following the former minority and Restatement view. An act of repair under such an agreement is sufficient
to permit an inference by the jury of this required degree of control.
Where the case involves a person outside the premises, the court will
infer the necessary dgree of control where it finds a right to make repairs reserved.
It is submitted that the distance separating New York law and that
of the courts following the Restatement with respect to the legal effect
of an agreement to repair is but a matter of an inference. New York
has, while paying lip service to Cullings 11. Goetz, in effect all but overruled it. Ohio, on the other hand, unimpressed by the policy factors
moving the New York court,41 continues to apply the rule of that case,
reaching contrary results on fundamentally the same facts.
And since the present New York position is, as pointed out above,
not only a trap for the unwary, but also a continuing invitation to
litigation, it perhaps is not too presumptuous to suggest that the time
is not far distant when New York will take the final step now
separating it from courts following the Restatement on this point.
Whether or not one agrees with the position of the Ohio court on
the basis of policy, it is at least true that in that state a landlord conscientiously un~ertaking to carry out a promise to repair a defect in
leased premises does not by so doing make himself automatically liable
for an injury for which, absent such undertaking, he could not have
been held liable.
William M. Myers, S. Ed.
41 "It is a notorious fact that those whose slender incomes force them to rent dilapidated
buildings are rarely, if ever, in such a financial position as to make it possible to expect them to
make the repairs necessary to safe occupancy. Therefore, if those who come into such buildings
as members of the tenant's household or otherwise are to be protected from injury and to be
given a chance of compensation if they are injured, 'it is obvious', as Justice Holmes said, 'that
the safety of the building must be left mainly to the lessor.'" Bohlen, "Fifty Years of Torts,"
50 HARv. L. RBv. 725 at 746 (1937).

